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Abstract
Has the expansion of wage employment in Vietnam  modestly.  Contrary  to the results  of uncorrected
exacerbated social inequalities,  despite  its contribution  to  methods,  wage employment contributes  a roughly  similar
income growth?  Gallup uses the two  rounds of the  amount to overall income inequality  as other
Vietnamese  Living Standards Survey  (VLSS) to evaluate  nonagricultural  employment (household  enterprise  and
the contribution of wage  employment to inequality  and  remittances,  mainly). Agricultural  income actually
income  growth over the period of rapid economic  reduces overall  income inequality because inequality
growth in the 1990s following market reforms.  If  between agricultural  householdls is much lower than
Vietnam sustains its economic development  in the future,  inequality between  nonagricultural  households, and
wage  employment will become an  ever more important  agricultural income has a lower correlation with other
source of household income as family farms and self-  income sources.  Wage employment  has not been the
employed  household  enterprises  become less prevalent.  locus of growing disparity  between the haves and the
Observing  the recent evolution of wage employment  have-nots in Vietnam.
compared with farm and nonfarm self-employment  A declining share of agriculture  as the economy grows
provides  clues as to how economic  development  will  in Vietnam means that income inequality will rise,
change Vietnamese society, in particular its impact on  assuming that within-sector inequality does not change.
income  inequality within and between  communities.  This rising inequality, due  to the shrinking  share of
Gallup shows that standard  methods for calculating  agriculture,  will be difficult  to avoid without giving up
income  inequality can  be severely biased due to  economic  growth and rapid poverty reduction  in
measurement  error when decomposing the contribution  Vietnam.  Historically,  the process of economic
of different sectors, regions, or groups to overall  development  has always brought about a transition out
inequality.  A new method for consistent decomposition  of small farms and household enterprises  into wage
of inequality  by income source shows that despite the  employment as worker productivity  increases  and non-
rapid growth of wages in the  1990s, wage  inequality fell  household  enterprises dominate  the economy.
This paper-a product of Macroeconomics  and Growth, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the
group to study household welfare and poverty reduction in Vietnam. Copies of the paper are available free from the World
Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Emily Khine, room MC3-347, telephone 202-473-7471,
fax 202-522-3518, email address kkhine@worldbank.org.  Policy Research  Working Papers are also posted on the Web at
http://econ.worldbank.org.  The author  may be contacted  at jgallup@main.rr.com.  September  2002. (42 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work  in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if  the presentations  are  less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
paper  are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
Produced  by the Research  Advisory StaffThe Wage Labor Market and Inequality in Vietnam in the  1  990s
John Luke Gallup
johngallup(cal.berkeley.eduI. Introduction
Vietnam has had very rapid economic growth since the implementation of the Doi Mai,
or Renovation, policies in the late 1980s, despite a sometimes fitful process of market
reforms.  This fitfulness  has been due to ideological doubts about moving towards a
market-based economy  as well as concern  about the social impact of the transformation.
The changes have indeed been dramatic.  Output per person grew at an average rate of
5.5 percent per year from  1988 to 1998, raising the average  level of output per person by
73 percent in a decade (see Figure  1).'  A transformation of this magnitude has touched
all facets of society, and dramatically reduced poverty.
Family farms and small-scale household enterprises still dominate the income-generating
activities of Vietnamese,  and much of the initial change due to Doi M6i occurred in these
sectors.  But wage employment is the future.  Historically, the process of economic
development has always brought about a transition out of small farms  and household
enterprises  into wage employment  as worker productivity increases and non-household
enterprises dominate the economy.  Scrutinizing the evolution of the labor market in the
1990's gives us clues about how economic development in Vietnam will continue to
affect households and society in the future.
The economic transformation in Vietnam, despite its positive impact on poverty, could
bring about rising inequality.  If that occurrs, the labor market is likely to be the source
of the disparity.  In cities, the development of private enterprise could create a
polarization of workers between those in high-paying skilled jobs and others, often
immigrants from the countryside,  who take low-skilled,  low-paying jobs.  If employment
creation is concentrated in the cities, it would widen the gap between rural and urban
dwellers.  If there was a lack of opportunity for the poor and an increasing  disparity of
income, it could contribute to many social problems.
This paper uses the two rounds of the Vietnamese  Living Standards Survey (VLSS) to
evaluate the contribution of wage employment to inequality and income growth over the
period of rapid economic growth in the 1990s following market reforms.  Has the
expansion of wage employment  in Vietnam exacerbated social inequalities, despite its
contribution to income growth?  If Vietnam sustains its economic development in the
future, wage employment will become  an ever more important source of household
income as family farms and self-employed household enterprises become  less prevalent.
Observing the recent evolution of wage employment compared  to farm and non-farm
self-employment  provides clues as to how economic development will change
Vietnamese society, in particular its impact on income inequality within and between
communities.
The paper shows that standard methods for calculating income inequality can be severely
biased due to measurement error when decomposing the contribution of different sectors,
regions;  or groups to overall inequality.  An alternative  consistent method for
decomposing income inequality is proposed, which is easy to calculate.
XOutput per capita is measured by real GNP per capita in 1995 US $ (World Bank, 2000b).The next section reviews developments  in the Vietnamese labor market in the  1990s,
focussing on wage employment (rather than self-employment).  Section I:I  explores  the
determinants of wages to find the individual  and community characteristics  that explain
why different people are paid different wages.  Section IV presents standard inequality
measures.  It discusses the important impact of measurement  error on inequality statistics
and proposes a new statistic that is not subject to the biases of standard inequality
measures.  Section V describes recent wage inequality in Vietnam,  and how it has
changed during the 1  990s.  Section VI measures the contribution wage employment to
overall income inequality.  Section VII uses the relationship between income sources  and
overall inequality to predict future changes in income inequality.  The last section is the
conclusion.
II. The Vietnamese Labor Market in the 1990s
This section evaluates how the rapid economic changes in Vietnam have affected labor
force participation, unemployment,  sectoral shifts in employment, and the growth and
regional differences in wages.
Labor Force Participation and Unemployment
In Vietnam, a high percentage of the working age population works.  Even when we
exclude housework (but include work on the household farm or household business),
81 % of all Vietnamese women and 85% of men aged  16 to 60 were working in 1993 (see
Table  1).2,3  As income rose during the 1990s, participation rates rose by 2% for women
and were unchanged for men.
In rural villages, participation  rates are even higher, at 83%  for women and 87% for men
in 1993.  Rural participation rates jumped by 4% for women, and stayed unchanged for
men, so that both rural men and rural women had the same 87% participation rate in
1998.
Participation rates were lower in urban areas than in rural areas in 1993,  at 74% for urban
women and 78% for urban men.  Unlike rural women, urban women's participation fell
2  The data for this paper comes from two rounds of the Vietnamese  Living Standards Survey (VLSS)
fielded in 1992-3 and 1997-8.  The VLSS is a nationally representative  stratified random sample  large
enough to provide good region-level estimates.  4800 households were interviewed  in 1992-3  (subsequently
referred to as the  1993  survey), and 6000 households  were interviewed in 1997-8  (the 1998  survey), with
over 4300 households interviewed  in both surveys.  The survey has extensive coverage of labor market
activities of household members, farm and non-farm self-employment  as well as a wide range of other
topics.  The survey includes the information to make a detailed calculation of household income as well as
a full household expenditure survey.  The  1993 survey sampled households proportionally to the population
in each region, but the 1998  survey oversampled  certain areas, requiring the use of sampling weights to
calculate representative  statistics.  The VLSS is described in more detail in Chapter I of this volume and
World Bank (1995, 2000a).
3  Labor force participation used in Table I refers to the seven days previous to the survey interview.  If we
include people who were not working during the past week, but worked at some time during the year, total
participation rises to 89% in 1998.
2substantially by 3% to 70% in 1998.  Urban men's participation  also fell slightly to 77%
in 1998.
Unemployment,  that is, people looking for work but not having a Job, is very low in
Vietnam.  The unemployment rate was half a percent in rural areas, and one and a half
percent in urban areas (Table 2).  Unemployment  fell by the a tenth of percentage point
from  1993 to  1998, an insignificant change.  The absence of unemployment is probably
due to a combination of Vietnam having too low an income level to permit people not to
work while job searching,  and the wide availability of self-employment on a household
farm or enterprise.
The Composition of Employment
Vietnam is still a highly agricultural country, with half of all workers working on family
farms, but the share of agricultural  employment is shrinking.
We define "self-employment"  in an unconventional  way because of inconsistencies
between the two rounds of the VLSS. The survey question asking whether the survey
respondent was self-employed in their main job in the previous seven days was changed
from the 1993  to the 1998 survey.  Using this self-employment question results in
dramatic, but spurious, changes in self-employment between  1993 and 1998.  To ensure
comparability,  Tables 3, 4 and 5 use the questions about whether the respondent has
worked in any job in the three sectors (wage employment,  non-agricultural  self-
employment,  and agricultural self-employment)  during the previous week, so that the
sector designations are not mutually exclusive.  To make the sectors mutually exclusive,
"wage employment" includes anyone who has worked in wage employment whether it
was their main job or not. "Non-agricultural  self-employment" excludes anyone who has
done any wage employment, and "agricultural  self-employment" excludes anyone with
any other employment.  This tends to exaggerates  the number of wage employees and
non-agricultural  self-employed at the expense of the agricultural self-employed,  but
should not bias the rate of change over time.
The share of agricultural self-employment  (family farms) fell from 52% in 1993 to 50%
in 1998 (Table  3).  The two percentage point drop in the employment share of
agricultural  self-employment was equally shared by increased wage employment and
non-agricultural  self-employment.  Wage employment and agricultural self-employment
each grew to 25% of total employment.
Rural men's employment changed more decidedly towards the wage labor market than
overall employment.  Of the three percentage point fall in agricultural self-employment,
two percentage points went into wage employment, but only one percentage point into
non-agricultural  self-employment from  1993 to 1998.
Rural women's employment is the most highly agricultural, with two-thirds of
employment on family farms.  It also fell the least, by one percentage point.  Rural
women's wage employment  also fell slightly, while non-agricultural self-employment
expanded by one percentage point.
3The changes in the urban sectoral composition of employment were more dramatic
(Table 5).  For urban men, agricultural self-employment  still accounted for thirteen
percent of employment in 1993, but it fell by five percentage points by  1998.  There was
a roughly equal transfer of employment into non-agricultural self-employment  and into
wage employment, which made up 53% of all employment by 1998.
Urban women saw the greatest increase in wage employment, of almost three percentage
points from 1993 to 1998.  The expansion of the wage employmnent came from a sharp
reduction in agricultural  self-employment  and a small reduction in non-agricultural  self-
employment.
Agricultural  employment shrank for everyone between  1993 and 1998.  It fell twice as
much in urban areas as rural areas, and twice as much for men as for women.  Where the
agricultural workers went differed for men and women.  Men's employment expanded
roughly equally into wage employment non-agricultural  self-employment in both urban
and rural areas.  For women in rural areas, the movement of women out of agricultural
was entirely absorbed by non-agricultural  self-employment,  while in urban areas, the
reduction of  women in agriculture went entirely into wage employment.
This paper will focus on wage employment of adults and its impact on inequality.
Questions of agricultural  and non-agricultural  employment are left aside for the rest of
the paper, but other chapters in this volume focus on agriculture (Benjamin and Brandt)
and household enterprise (Vijverberg).
Wage Growth
We have seen that there was a steady expansion of wage employment in Vietnam in the
1990s for men and urban women. What happened to wages as this expansion occurred?
Despite the expansion of wage employment,  wages in Vietnam grew extremely rapidly in
the 1990s.  Average hourly wages increased by 10.5% per year in real terms between the
1993  and the 1998 VLSS surveys  (Table 6).  Wage levels increased by two-thirds in just
five years.  Wage growth was considerably faster than the growth in household income
per person in the same period, which grew at 8.7% per year, as well as output per person
in the economy as a whole which grew at 6.0% per year.4 '5
Regional Wage Differences
Wage growth and wage levels were distributed unevenly across in different regions of the
country, with a split between the two primary cities and the rest of the country (Table 6).6
Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi had higher wages than the rest of the country in 1993 and
their wages grew much faster up until  1998.
4 Household income per capita growth is calculated from VLSS93  and VLSS98 data.
5  Output per capita growth is measured by real GNP per capita growth in 1995 US $ (World Bank, 2000b).
6 Wages here are hourly total conmpensation  from the main job in the past seven days (or from the main job
in the past twelve months  if there is no main job in past seven days).  This includes the value of
compensation in kind as well  as money wages. -
4In 1998,  average Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi wages were more than 50% higher than in
all the other regions.  Ho Chi Minh City wages started out 37% higher than all other
regions in 1993  and, and grew one percentage point faster than overall wages until 1998.
Wages in Hanoi were not much higher than wage levels in other parts of the country in
1993, but grew by 19% per year to become the highest wages in the country,  even 5%
higher than Ho Chi Minh City wages in 1998.
Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi together make up a significant part of Vietnam's wage
labor market,  accounting for 25% of all wage jobs in the  1998 VLSS survey although
they only account  for 8% of the country's population (18% of all wage employment is in
Ho Chi Minh City and 7% in Hanoi).7
Outside of Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, average wages in Vietnam were surprisingly
similar across regions in 1993, and they became more so by 1998.  Regions with lower
wages in 1993  are the ones that saw the biggest wage increases  in the 1993-1998 period,
and the regions with the highest wages initially tended to grow more slowly.  Medium-
sized urban and rural central regions had the lowest average wages in 1993 and saw the
largest increase in wages by 1998.  The rural south, which had the highest wages outside
of the two largest cities in 1993 saw the lowest increase in the following five years.  With
the exception  of the two biggest cities, labor markets seem to be equilibrating over this
period, with wages becoming more similar over the course of the 1990s,.
The divergence of the biggest cities from the rest of the country could be due to the fact
that the demographic characteristics of workers and kinds of employment are different in
different parts of the country.  If the best-educated,  most productive workers are drawn to
the main cities, the wage disparity could be due to differences  in worker characteristics
rather than differences in wages for the same kinds of workers.  Table 7 makes wage
rates more comparable  across region by restricting wages of those workers with at least a
lower secondary school  education, working for a private non-governmental  or non-state-
owned business, and a non-agricultural business.  Skilled, private, non-agricultural wages
show even faster growth over the  1993-1998 period, and a stronger convergence  across
regions than overall wages, again with the exception of the two primary cities.  Hanoi had
the lowest level of skilled private wages of any region in 1993 but caught up so fast that it
had the highest wages of all by 1998, with wage growth of  27% per year.8 When we look
at workers with high education and private, non-agricultural  employers,  Hanoi and Ho
Chi Minh City still have over a 50% wage premium.  Except for the rural south, the two
biggest cities have a 75%  wage premium over the rest of the country for skilled private
employment.
' The urban population of Ho Chi Minh City was 4.4 million in 2000, and Hanoi had 1.6 million people out
of a total population of Vietnam of 77.9 million.  Ho Chi Minh City made up 5.6% of the population and
Hanoi made up 2.1%  (World Bank, 2000b).
8 Some of the regional changes in Table 7 may be due to small sample sizes.  In the worst case, there were
only 20 skilled,  private, non-agricultural wage observations for Hanoi in  1993.  Averages in all other tables
come from sample sizes of over 200 observations  with the exception of Hanoi in  1993 for wage-related
tables with a sample size of 136.
5Hours Worked
At the same time that hourly wages grew extremely rapidly and employment shifted
towards the wage labor market, hours worked in wage labor also increased rapidly,  all of
which contributed to the large rise in wage income.  On average, hours worked in wage
employment increased by 18%  from 1993 to  1998 (Table 8).  In 1993 there was a sharp
difference between rural and urban wage  employment in terms of total hours worked.
Workers in medium and large cities worked about 50% more hours per year than rural
wage laborers on average.  Workers in Ho Chi Minh City worked the longest hours in
1993, averaging 2176 hours per year.  Assuming an eight hour work day and a five day
work week, this works out to 272 work days, or 54 work weeks.9 These are long hours
by any standard.  Despite this, by 1998 working hours in Ho Chi Minh City had grown by
nine percentage  points.  Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi,  and medium urban centers had the
highest working hours in 1993, but had increases in working hours much more modest
than rural and small urban increases.  Rural and small urban areas partially caught up
with the working hours in the medium and large cities between  1993 and  1998, with
increases in rural wage labor working hours much larger than the increases  in large cities.
Wage Employment Patterns
In sum, wage employment  shows remarkable  growth in wage levels, hours worked, and a
more modest increase in the fraction of workers employed outside the home.  Hanoi and
Ho Chi Minh City maintain large wage premia, probably due to the residency permit
restrictions in these cities that keep out people not born in the city.
III. Determinants of Wages  in the 1990s
Which individual characteristics  or employment  characteristics  determine how much an
individual earns in the labor market?  Previous work shows that wages  are typically
positively correlated with education levels and with work experience (at a decreasing
rate).'0 In other countries, wages are typically negatively correlated with being female or
an ethnic minority.  Wages also typically vary by regions within,a country.  In the case of
Vietnam where much of wage employment is still offered by the state and there is still a
large amount of agricultural employment,  indicators of private and non-agricultural
employment  also explain wage levels.
Returns to Education and Experience
We explore the determinants of wages with a simple earnings equation:
log(Wage,) = A  + A3Xii  + ** +  3K X,i
9  54 weeks is more than a year, so the workers must have been working more than five days a week or eight
hours a day.  At the time of the two surveys,  the standard Vietnamese  work week was six days.
10 See  Bemdt, 1991, Chapter 5 for an accessible explanation of wage determinants and the regression
specification used below.
6Where  Wagei is the wage of individual  i, X1 i,..., X,i are the K correlates of wages (such as
education,  experience,  etc.), and  80,,B,.. ., /3K  are the effects of the correlates on wages.
log( ) is the natural logarithm.  With certain assumptions, the coefficient  on education
(,3,)  can be interpreted as the internal  rate of return to an additional year of schooling
(see Berndt, p. 162).
The estimated effect of education and experience on wages is shown in Table 9.  The
estimated rate of return of schooling in Vietnam in 1993 was quite low, just 2.9%.  The
rate almost doubled to 5.0% in 1998, but is still very low compared to other developing
countries.  Psacharopoulos  (1985, p.588), for example, reports an average rate of return
of 11% for Asian countries,  13% for Africa, and 14% for Latin America among a large
number of similar studies using a similar model of wage determinants.  The increase  in
the rate of return to schooling from  1993 to  1998 of 2.1% is statistically significant.
"Experience",  which is actually years since completion of schooling, is strongly
positively correlated with wages, but at a decreasing rate, as expected, and shows no sign
of changing from 1993 to 1998.
Table  10 shows a broader group correlates of wages: being female, a member of a non-
Chinese ethnic minority, having Chinese origins, working for a non-agricultural
employer, working for a non-governmental  employer, and indicators of living in the two
primary cities in Vietnam.  The correlation of real wages with years of schooling is still
strongly positive, though even lower with the inclusion of other correlates, and it still has
a statistically significant increase from 1993 to  1998.  Experience has a stable positive,
but decreasing correlation with wages.
Women in Vietnam eam much less then men with the same observable characteristics,
although the difference became smaller between  1993 and 1998.  In 1993, wages  for
women were 31%  less than their male counterparts, even after controlling for education
and experience.  The gap between men's and women's wages in Vietnam became  smaller
by 1998, when women's wages were  17% smaller. 11 The wage gap between men and
women halved between  1993  and 1998,  a statistically significant  change.
Non-ethnic-Vietnamese  (that is, non-Kinh) and non-chinese ethnic minorities do not
show lower wage in 1993, but do show a 10% lower wage in 1998.  Ethnic Chinese in
Vietnam show the opposite pattern.  They had a 25% wage premium in 1993, but this all
but disappeared  by 1998.
In both 1993  and 1998, non-agricultural  employers paid higher wages, and in 1998,
private employers paid a statistically signficant  higher wage than state employers.
The regression in Table 10 properly tests whether the two primary cities, Ho Chi Minh
City and Hanoi, have significant wage premia, other things being equal.  Residents of
1 The estimated effect of a dummy variable in the wage regression is  eb -1,  where b is the coefficient
estimate.
7both cities earn much higher wages than residents of other regions with the same
characterstics.  Ho Chi Minh City earned a remarkable 80% higher wage than rural or
small and medium urban area residents with the same education,  experience, etc. in 1998.
Hanoi residents earned 47% higher wages  in 1998 than Vietnamese  living outside the two
largest cities.  There is no sign that the wage premia of Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi fell
during the period from 1993 to 1998.
It should be noted that the R2 statistic indicates that only 18%  and 22% of the variation of
wages in 1993  and 1998, respectively,  were explained by the correlates  in Table 10, so
the largest part of wage variation is due to other unidentified factors.
Table 11  shows the effect of correlates on wage levels in 1998 separately by seven
regions.  The regional differences  are strong.  The rates of return to schooling are
especially low in the rural Central region, in Small Urban areas, and in the rural South,
where the rate of return is not significantly different from zero.  The rate of return to
schooling in Hanoi and the rural North is more than double the level in the three lowest
regions, approaching a respectable 8.5%  in Hanoi and 6.9% in the surrounding rural
North.
The disadvantage of being female is pretty similar around the country except in the rural
North and the rural Central region, where women come closer to obtaining their male
counterparts  earmings.  The disadvantage of being a woman is greatest in Hanoi, where
average wages for women are 25%  lower wages for men with similar characteristics.
The disadvantage of being a non-Chinese ethnic minority varies widely across regions.12
Only in Ho Chi Minh City and the rural South did ethnic minorities have statistically
significantly lower wages in 1998, 29% in Ho Chi Minh City and 18%  lower in the rural
South.  In Hanoi, the wages of ethnic minorities were on average almost four times
higher than the wages of non-minorities.  This may be due to a small sample effect, since
this reflects just 16 persons out the small Hanoi sample of 215 wage earners, but the
coefficient remains significant and of similar size in a quantile regression.
Non-agricultural  employers paid higher wages in all the regions, but the effect was most
pronounced in Hanoi, the rural North, and small urban areas.  Private employers only
clearly paid a wage premium in the rural North and the rural Central region, which could
be due to the traditionally strong communist roots in these two regions which could
motivate workers to take government jobs despite low government wages.
The clearest result from exploring the determinants of wage levels is that the labor market
rate of return to schooling in Vietnam is quite low, but seems to have improved during
the 1990s.  It points to a vicious cycle in low education regions, because the rate of return
is lowest in those parts of the country with the lowest education levels (the South), and
the rate of return to education is highest in the highest education regions (the North).
12 An indicator for Chinese ethnicity was not included in the regional wage regressions in Table  11  because
a number of regions had no Chinese in the survey samnple.
8There is also a substantial male/female wage gap, but this seems to have diminished
during the  1990s.
IV.  Methods  for Measuring Inequality
The previous sections explored the remarkable  growth of Vietnamese wages  in the  1990s.
The rest of the paper will examine the impact of wage' employment on inequality in
Vietnam.  We start by considering  a number of different measures of inequality that have
desirable properties.
We choose inequality measures according  to three criteria: they satisfy the "principle of
transfers", they are additively decomposable across subgroups,  and they can handle
negative income values. 1 3 The principle of transfers  is the intuitively appealing
requirement that a transfer of income from a poorer to a richer person will increase the
measure of inequality, so long as the transfer is not so large as to reverse the two persons'
relative positions.  All the commonly used inequality measures  satisfy the principle of
transfers.  In particular, the Gini coefficient, the Generalized Entropy measures and the
Atkinson inequality measures all adhere to the principle of transfers.
The decomposition of inequality across a set of groups is useful for assessing how much
of total inequality is due to differences within the groups and how much is due to
differences between the groups.  These groups can be any mutually exclusive
subgrouping of the population, such as region of residence or a household  characteristic.
Among inequality measures  with standard characteristics,  only the Generalized Entropy
measures of inequality are additively decomposable,  where the inequality within
subgroups and the inequality between subgroups sums to total inequality (Shorrocks,
1984).
The decomposition of  inequality across the source of income is a different problem
because the sources are not mutually exclusive categories.  Many households have
income sources from more than one sector, for example from farming and wage
employment.  The additive decomposition of inequality across sources or uses of income
is possible for any inequality index, and Shorrocks  (1982) shows that there is only one
rule for decomposing the inequality that satisfies a small number of  reasonable
properties.
Only two of the common inequality measures that satisfy the principle of transfers are
well-defined for negative income levels, such as occur when there are year-on-year  losses
to farm and enterprise self-employment:  the Gini coefficient  and one of  the Generalized
Entropy measures (I2, which is half the squared coefficient of variation).
This study uses four measures of inequality:  the Gini coefficient and three Generalized
Entropy inequality measures (see Appendix A for formal definitions of the inequality
measures).  The Gini coefficient is probably the most commonly used inequality measure,
13 Deaton (1997, pp.  134-140) provides a good short explanation of inequality measures.
9and can be defined  as a multiple of the covariance of individual income and the rank of
individual income divided by average income. The Gini coefficient ranges between zero
(perfect equality)  and one (perfect inequality).
The Generalized  Entropy measures of inequality are designated Ia, where the more
positive the a parameter, the more sensitive the index is to differences  at the top of the
income distribution rather than the bottom.  We use IO  (also known as the Mean
Logarithmic Deviation), I, (a.k.a. the Theil index), and '2  (12 the squared Coefficient of
Variation).
For mutually exclusive  groups of people, a Generalized Entropy income inequality index
for the whole population decomposes into a weighted sum of the inequality indices of the
groups that make up the whole.  Generalized Entropy indices I,  can be written as the sum
Ia = IaW  + I,ZB  of the total within-group inequality Iaw and between-group  inequality
ag-14  The formulas for Iaw and Iag,  are in Appendix A.
The solution for decomposing the share of inequality from income sources is simpler and
more elegant.  For any J sources of income, overall income inequality can be
decomposed into the inequality contributed by each source
E cov(yj,y),  (1)
j=,  var(y)
where cov( ) is the sample covariance and var( ) is the sample variance.  Since the
inequality index I appears on both sides of the equations, it implies that the shares of
inequality sum to one, and that they are independent of any particular inequality index
chosen.  Since our interest is in the relative contributions of each income source, we can
dispense with the actual inequality index entirely.  Note that if the covariance of the
income from a particular source is negatively correlated with total income, that income
source makes a negative contribution to total inequality.  In particular, income sources
characteristic of poor households may contribute negatively to inequality because when
these sources predominate in the household, total income is lower resulting in a negative
correlation.
Measurement  Error
Measurement  error is a serious problem when studying inequality, more than it is when
studying other issues.  Averages and growth rates of averages are typically unbiased in
the presence of random measurement  error due to the law of large numbers.  Inequality
measures, though,  are typically biased  and inconsistent  in the presence of measurement
error.  Inequality is a measurement of variability, which is systematically increased by
errors.  Positive and negative errors balance out in the sample average, but both positive
and negative errors add to the variance.
14 I thank Paul Glewwe  for pointing  out that the weights used to decompose the Generalized Entropy
measure 12 do not sum to one (unlike the decomposition weights for 10 and II), which makes the
decomnposition of  ! 2 hard to interpret.
10More important for this study than biases in the estimated level of inequality is that
different income sources  are likely to be suffer from very different levels of measurement
error.  Wage incomes are usually well-known by the survey respondent and others,
making them easier to report accurately.  Income from household  farms and household
enterprises  are very difficult for the household and the researcher to calculate correctly.
If household self-employment  income has systematically large measurement error, wage
employment could (spuriously) appear to contribute little to inequality while household
enterprises appear to contribute a great deal to inequality, even when true income from
both sources has the same inequality.
Most inequality indices depend on the variance of some transformation of income.  The
bias to inequality measures caused by measurement error is easily seen in the case of the
I2 inequality measure, which is the variance of income divided by its sample mean
squared.  Say that measured income y; is equal to actual income yI plus a mean zero
U2
measurement  error  si, with variance  c:
Y;  =yi +  .
Actual  income yi has mean  p  and variance  a 2 , and is uncorrelated with the
measurement error.  Average measured income,  y  , is unbiased:  E(yV) = E(y-) =  u, but
the sample variance of measured income is biased:  var(y)  = var(y) + var(s) =  2 + o2r.
This causes inequality measures such as I2 to be inconsistent when income is measured
with error:
*var()
12 =  .2
2  y
plim I2  =  2  >  =plmI2.
The bigger the measurement error, the bigger the bias in the inequality index.'5
Likewise if one calculates the relative contribution to inequality from different income
sources using Shorrock's formula in Equation 1, the calculated  contribution to inequality
of income from sources that are poorly measured would be bigger than the calculated
contribution of better measured income sources, simply due to measurement error.  This
is shown formally in Appendix B.
Measurement of household income is fraught with error, especially in low income
countries.  Survey respondents may have some reluctance to state their true income, and
especially where household farm and non-farm  enterprises predominate, as in Vietnam,
households may not know even know their precise income.  Calculating net revenue  for
household enterprises requires  aggregating large numbers of recurrent input and labor
costs and product sales as well as intractable practical and conceptual problems.  How
'5  This has interesting  implications for cross-country inequality comparisons.  Countries with worse-
measured income data (which are probably poorer),  will have a spuriously larger calculated inequality
index.does one account  for home production, barter arrangements,  and especially,  large
purchases of capital equipment that will provide services over many years? The VLSS
makes a valiant effort to measure all of these items across hundreds of categories of
inputs and outputs, but the overall aggregation of household net revenues nonetheless
contains substantial errors.  There are quite extreme positive  and negative outliers in farm
and non-farm household net revenues.  There is no practical way to ensure that answers
to all these questions about components of household net revenues  add up to a consistent
inventory of costs and revenues  (although it would be interesting to confront the survey
respondents with the calculated net result to see if they felt it corresponded to reality!).
Researchers  using the calculated household net income often resort to more or less
arbitrary ways of trimming the outliers, but this does nothing to solve the problem of
statistical bias caused by measurement  error.'6
The usual way that researchers work around this problem is to ignore the income data and
use instead the better-measured  household expenditure  data.  In fact, household
expenditure,  that is, consumption, is what we really want to measure anyway because it is
a direct measure of the material well-being  attained by the household.
Household expenditure  can be thought of as an estimate of "permanent income"
(Friedman,  1957).  Household consumption decisions and well-being depend on the
household's  assessment of the smoothed expected income rather than the fluctuating
annual transitory income.  Since we care about the inequality in household well-being
rather than inequality of transitory annual income, we could view the measured annual
income as subject to two kinds of measurement error.  One is the mismeasurement  of
annual income due to imperfect collection of household information.  The other the
mismeasurement  of permanent income using accurately measured annual income data.
In a context of highly variable annual  income from year to year, inequality in well-being
using household income data will be overestimated  when households are able to smooth
consumption. 17
For this study, the simple solution of using household expenditure  data rather than
income data for inequality calculations does not work.  Expenditure does not tell us how
wage employment  contributes to household  income relative to other sources.  Using
income data directly for investigating the contribution of wages to inequality is especially
problematic because while measurement  errors are large for household self-employment
earnings, the errors in wage earnings  data are probably much smaller.  Survey
respondents usually know precisely what they are paid, and they know that people around
them already have a good idea of what they earn,  so they have less reason to hide what
16  This is certainly not a criticism of collecting detailed household production  data in the VLSS and similar
surveys.  As noted,  the mean income estimates are still unbiased.  These data are very valuable to studying
important questions of household productionper se.  And it is often possible to use the noisy income data
to calculate consistent estimates  of income inequality,  as done in this paper.
'7Consumption  smoothing is harder in Vietnam because financial institutions  are poorly developed and
over the years have undermined their credibility with arbitrary behavior.  However, this does not prevent
consumption smoothing through the saving of commodities  and durable goods,  informal credit and debt
arrangements within the village,  and financial savings often in the form of buried gold.
12they earn. 18 This makes calculating the contribution to income inequality of wage
employment versus household production misleading.  Even with exactly the same
distribution of income from wage employment as from household self-employment,
measurement  errors in the self-employment  data would spuriously show that self-
employment  contributes much more to income inequality, giving the false impression that
wage employment  is an equalizing force.  In addition, household farm and non-farm
production revenues are inherently variable due to natural weather and market
fluctuations whereas wage payments are relatively stable.  Since the distribution of well-
being is what we care about, estimating the inequality contribution of household
production income versus wage employment income even with perfectly measured
annual income data would also spuriously show that household production was
disequalizing  even when permanent income had the same inequality across the income
sources.
We can still consistently estimate the contribution of wage employment versus household
production to the distribution of household income.  We start by estimating the share of
each income source from income data, but then apply it to expenditure data. Because the
measurement  errors for income  are generally uncorrelated with the measurement  errors in
expenditure, measurement  errors cancel out as in averages,  not accumulate  as in
variances.  The result is a consistent estimate of the contribution of income sources to
inequality, as shown formally in Appendix B.
V. Vietnamese Wage Inequality in the 1990s
We apply the methods described in the previous section to look empirically at the
relationship between wages and distribution in Vietnam using the two VLSS surveys.
The distribution of wages equalized to some extent during the 1990s.  We divide wage
earners into the "rich", the highest 20% of wages, the "middle class" with the middle
60% of wages, and the "poor" with the lowest 20% of wages.  The wages of the poor
grew at  14% per year, which was faster than the growth in the wages of the middle class
(10% per year) and the rich (12% per year) (see Table 12).  Note that households in the
rich, middle,  and poor categories in 1993 are not necessarily the same households  in
those categories in the 1998.
Since the VLSS  survey reinterviewed  the same households in 1998 that were in the
original  1993 survey, we can also see what happened to those who were in the poorest or
richest quintile in 1993 (Table  13).  There was a high degree of earnings mobility, both
up and down.1 9 Of those who started out in the poorest quintile in 1993, only 34% of
1 8 Household rice harvests and certain other staple crop yields  are probably conmuon knowledge  in rural
Vietnam, to other villagers  as well as to the village tax authorities,  but input costs are not, and a lot of the
profit in household  farming is in difficult-to-observe  non-staple  agricultural production.  Non-farm
household enterprises  are also very difficult for outsiders to observe.
19  As shown by Glewwe and Nguyen (this volume), measured mobility is highly sensitive to errors, so part
of the apparent high wage mobility could be due to measurement errors.
13them were among the poorest in 1998. Because of this wage mobility, average wages of
the poorest 20% in 1993 grew on average 24% per year.  On the other hand, of those in
the richest 20% in 1993, only 54% of them were still among the richest wage earners in
1998, and average wages of the richest in 1993 grew by only 5% per year.
We can also look backwards  from the perspective of those who ended up in the richest or
poorest quintile of earners in 1998 (Table 14).  The picture is quite different.  Those who
ended up the poorest actually saw their average wage decline by 1% in the previous  six
years, while those who were the richest saw their wages grow by 16% per year.  How can
the prospective view of the richest and poorest in 1993 look so different  from the view in
hindsight in  1998?  Because the poor in 1993 was not the same group as the poor in 1998.
Most of the poorest wage eamers in 1993 did not stay poor, and most of the poor in 1998
did not start out poor in 1993.  Only 34% of those who were the poorest in  1998 had
started out poor in 1993.  This great churning within the labor market showed that those
who held a job throughout this period had many opportunities to succeed and to fail.
There was a strong tendency of  regression to the mean: receiving  especially low or high
wages was usually a transitory phenomenon.
The simple table of wages by lowest, middle,  and highest wage rates in Table  12 suggests
that the distribution of wages has become more equal over the  1990s.  This is confirmed
by the summary measures of wage inequality in Tables  15  and  16.  The statistics
calculated  are lo, I,, I2, and the Gini coefficient,  as defined in Appendix A.  Overall wage
inequality in Vietnam has indeed fallen from 1993 to 1998 by all measures except 12,
which most strongly weights high wage earners.
The general pattern of decreasing wage inequality contrasts sharply with what happened
in the medium and large cities.  Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and the second tier medium
urban centers had by far the lowest wage inequality in  1993.  They are  also the only
regions of the country to see a rise in wage inequality over the 1990s.  Hanoi and Ho Chi
Minh City's wage inequality rose quickly, while it stayed the same in medium urban
areas, and fell sharply in the rest of the country.  It is likely that this unusual pattern in
wage inequality, like the wage premium in the two largest cities, is influenced by the
residency permit restrictions that are enforced there.  In fact,  wage inequality was
probably worse in 1998 than these statistics show because the VLSS sample does not
properly cover illegal migrants into the two biggest cities who lack residency permits,
since the survey sample was drawn from local residency records.  The illegal migrants
almost surely have among the lowest wages  in the big cities.
Another factor that could explain the low inequality in 1993 and the high inequality in
1998 for the medium and large  cities is the prevalence of government employment  there.
In 1993, government employment was likely a large part of the wage labor market which
tends to equalize wages since government wage levels tend to be similar across jobs.
These cities are also the locations  that have seen the greatest structural transformation
during the 1990s, so that government employment played a much smaller role in 1998.
14The three Generalized Entropy inequality indices Io, II, and I2 allow us to compare the
within-region inequality in wage rates versus between-region inequality.  Despite the
wage premium in the two biggest cities, between-region inequality accounts for only
between  12% and  15% of overall wage inequality in 1998, depending on the index (Table
16).  All the rest of the inequality is due to variation within regions.  Eliminating the
cross-regional differences in wages would have some effect on wage inequality, but most
of it would remain.
VI. Wages  and Income Inequality
If wage inequality fell between  1993 and 1998, what happened to the contribution of
wages to overall income inequality?  In this section we measure the impact of wages on
income inequality, both using the simple, but biased, method in Equation 1 and the
consistent method derived in Appendix B.
The inequality of household expenditure per person (as a measure of  permanent income)
rose from  1993 to 1998 (Table  17) at the same time that the inequality of wages was
declining.  Depending on the inequality measure, inequality rose by 5% to 13%.  Wages
are the major source of income for only a minority of Vietnamese households  (only 18%
of households in 1998, accounting for 21% of average household  expenditure per person
- see Table  18).  Fifty-four percent of households depend in farming for their main
income source, and another  18% rely on income from a household  enterprise for the main
income.  The remaining  10% get their most of their income from other sources in a given
year, mostly overseas remittances and other gifts, with some interest and leasing income.
Farming households have the lowest average per capita expenditure,  only 60% of the
income of predominantly wage employment households.  But the average expenditure  of
wage-earning households are not the highest.  Households running their own business
had an average expenditure per person 13% higher than wage-earning households, and
households who receive their main income from other sources do even better on average.
As discussed above, household income data suffers from substantial measurement errors,
especially for farms and household enterprises since income must be netted out of the a
large number of costs and revenues.  Measurement  errors tend to be large (and less
obvious to survey respondents) when the measurements are the differences between
much larger numbers, like costs and revenues.
Table  19 and 20 present the biased calculation of the share of inequality attributed to each
income source using the formula in Equation 1 (in the column "No Correction").  The
second column in Tables 19 and 20 present the consistent calculation of inequality shares
using the formula in Appendix B (in the columns "Consistent Estimates").
There are large differences  between the uncorrected estimates and the consistent
estimates of inequality shares.  The contribution to inequality of farming is
underestimated  by the biased calculation, and the contribution of wage employment and
15other income is underestimated.  In both 1993  and 1998, the biased estimate shows that
farming contributes  to inequality, which the consistent estimate shows that equally
distributed farm income actually reduces  income inequality.  In 1998,  the differences are
especially dramatic.  The biased calculation shows that farming contributes  about as
much to total income inequality as wage employment.  In fact, the consistent estimates
show that wage employment contributes  33 percentage points more of total inequality
than farming income does.  Whereas wage employment accounts for 29% of total income
inequality in 1998, farming income reduces inequality by 3%.  The consistent estimates
also show how important "other income", which is largely overseas remittances,  is to
income inequality,  contributing almost half of all inequality in  1993, despite contributing
the smallest share of income  at 16%.  The income share of other income rose to 18% in
1998, but its contribution to inequality fell to one third of the total, presumably because
remittances  are being spread more equally among households in 1998.
The share of inequality due to wage employment increased from 26% in 1993 to 33% in
1998, at the same time that the inequality of wages itself declined.  This is possible
because wage income was strongly negatively correlated with other income sources in
1993, but essentially uncorrelated with other income sources in 1998.20  In other words,
high wage earners are more likely to be in households with high incomes from other
sources, such as farming and household businesses, in  1998 compared to 1993.  In fact all
income sources have become both less negatively correlated with other sources and less
variable from 1993 to 1998, but the negative correlation of wage income fell more than
for the other sources.  This pattern suggests a diversification of economic activity within
the household that one would expect from the period of rapid development that Vietnam
has experienced.
Another way of quantifying the contribution of wage employment to household
inequality which proves useful for projecting  future inequality below is to divide
households according to their primary income source and decompose household
expenditure inequality by type of household.  Tables 21 and 22 show that predominantly
farming household expenditure is much more equally distributed than non-farm
household expenditure.  Inequality in household expenditure between other kinds of
households  are roughly similar, with the highest inequality among predominantly wage
employment households.  Wage employment households had the highest inequality
among household types in 1998, even though the previous analysis showed that wage
employment income is responsible for a smaller share of household inequality than
enterprise income (Table 20), because high income wage employment households are
more likely to have extra income from non-wage sources.  Predominantly wage
20 The share of inequality of one income source compared to another depends on the ratio of the covariance
of each income source with total income (see Appendix B).  For the case of wage income, its share of
inequality  is bigger the bigger the covariance of wage income with total income.  Since cov(y,,, y) = var(yw)
+ cov(y,,  y1), where Yw  is wage income, y is total income, and y, is income  from other sources, the share of
wage income in inequality depends both on the inequality of wage income itself (var(yw)) and how
correlated  wage income is with other income sources.  Because  income is measured with error, the
consistent  estimates inequality use total expenditure  as an instrument for total income in the covariance
calculations.
16employment households had higher inequality in 1998 than 1993 due to earning income
from other sources, not from high inequality of  wages themselves.
The consistent estimates of the contribution of each income source to total income
inequality show that wage employment contributes almost a third of income equality
about on par with household  enterprise income and other income even though it only
contributes  about 20 percent of total income.  Farm income, instead of being a substantial
contributor to inequality as the uncorrected  estimates make it appear, actually reduces
household income inequality.  The decomposition of household expenditure inequality by
predominant income source also shows that predominantly wage employment
households, household enterprise households,  and other income households have similar
levels of  inequality,  while farm households are substantially more equal.
VII. Projections of Future Inequality
The previous  section showed that predominantly wage income households  are roughly
similar to predominantly household  enterprise  and "other" income households both in
terms of inequality and income'levels.  Farming households, on the other hand, are quite
distinct.  They have much less within-sector inequality,  and they have a much lower
average income level.
One of clearest historical patterns of economic  development is the shrinking role of
agricultural  sector as the economy grows, both as an employer of labor. and as a share of
output.  Farms now make up half of all households in Vietnam.  The fact that farm
households are very different from other households, they are a large part of the
economy, and their relative number will diminish as the economy grows means that we
can predict an important part of how inequality will change in the near future.  Inequality
in Vietnam will rise over time as the proportion of equally-distributed  farming
households falls in the economy.
We can make empirical predictions of how fast inequality will change as the Vietnamese
economy develops by examining the relationship between the decline of agriculture and
economic  development in other countries around the world.  The relationship between
income growth and the share of labor in agriculture,  and the relationship between income
growth and the ratio of agricultural income to total income are both well-established
international patterns.  If we estimate these relationships from historical data, and we can
assume that inequality within the farming and non-farming sectors remains unchanged,
we can predict the future course of inequality as a function of economic growth.
Statistics from the previous section confirm that farm households have more equally
distributed income and lower income levels than non-farm households, and that non-farm
households are similar across sectors.  The Generalized Entropy indices of inequality in
Table 22 are half the level for farming that they are for other income sources.
Predominantly farming households have 54% of the average income of non-farming
households (Table 18).  The inequality indices for households whose main income
sources are household enterprise, wage employment, or other income sources all have
17inequality indices within 8% of each other (Table 22) and average  incomes within 30% of
each other (Table  18).
To estimate the relationship between income level (as measured by GDP per person) and
share of labor force in agriculture,  and between income level and agricultural output
relative to total output, we use cross-country time-series data.2'  Figure 2 shows the cross-
country relationship between GDP per person and the share of labor force in agriculture.
The data come from  111 countries with an average of 30 observations per country.  The
data shown for each country in Figure 2 are actually points on country-specific  log linear
trend lines to highlight the relationship in each country.  Only 4% of countries had
positive income growth and increasing share of the labor force in agriculture.  Of the 15%
of countries with an upward sloping country trend, 89% of them were countries with
shrinking income, so the share of labor force in agriculture  fell even though the economy
was getting poorer.  This suggests that the share of agriculture falls over time
independently of income growth due to technical change.
The estimated relationship between the share of labor force and GDP per capita using
cross-country data shows a strong decline in the share of agricultural labor as the income
level rises (Table 23, column  1).  The regression includes country-specific  constants and
a time trend, which shows a clear but small decline in the share of agricultural labor over
time of a half a percentage point per year.  The simple regression is able to explain 73%
of all the cross-country variation in the labor force share in agriculture.
The ratio of agricultural income per person to average income per person is also strongly
correlated with the level of income per person and time (Table 23, column 2).
Agricultural incomes are lower relative to non-agricultural  incomes at higher GDP per
person levels, but agricultural  incomes became  more similar to non-agricultural  incomes
over time, probably due to technical change in agriculture.  The net effect for a country
growing at the rate of Vietnam in the  1990s is a decrease in agricultural incomes relative
to non-agricultural  incomes.  The agriculture income share regression explains 21% of
the cross-country variation.
The inequality projection  is based on the assumption that the Vietnamese economy
continues  to grow at the rate at which it has for the previous decade:  gross domestic
product (GDP) per person grew 5.5% per year from 1988 to 1998.  In other words, this is
a projection of what would happen to income inequality if Vietnamese  economic growth
continued as it has in the recent past.
The inequality projections are shown in Table 24.  The first column shows the actual
figures for 1998,  and the second and third columns show the projects for 2003 and 2008,
respectively.  The projection of the proportion of labor in agriculture depends on the
regression estimates from Table 23, and shows a decline of 3.8% per five years.  The
projection of future agricultural GDP per worker depends on the second regression
21 The cross country data for share of labor force in agriculture and the ratio of agricultural  value added to
total output are from World Bank (2000b).  The purchasing power parity GDP per person data are from the
Penn World Tables 6.0 (2002).
18estimates in Table 23, and shows that agricultural GDP per worker as a fraction of overall
GDP per person declines by 3.4% per five years.
The within agriculture and within non-agriculture  income inequality is assumed to stay
constant at the 1998 level, and is measured by the Io inequality index.  The total within
inequality measure depends on the proportion of households in agriculture (which is
taken to be equal to the proportion of labor in agriculture).  As the proportion of the labor
force in agriculture declines going forth to 2003 and 2008, total within inequality
increases because agricultural households have lower inequality and their share of
households is shrinking.
Between inequality also increases because average agricultural and non-agricultural
incomes are diverging.  Taking the sum of the within and between measures of
inequality, total inequality increases by 4.9% from 1998 to 2003, and 4.4% from 2003 to
2008.  This compares to an actual increase to Io of 9.6% from  1993 to 1998.
This projection shows with numbers that the secular decline in agriculture as the
economy grows will increase inequality due to a shift in the composition of households,
since Vietnamese  agricultural households have much less inequality between them than
non-agricultural households.  The second effect captured in the projections is that the
relative  incomes of the average agricultural household and the average non-agricultural
household will continue to diverge as the economy grows, causing the between-sector
inequality to grow.  This second effect actually accounts for more than half of the change
in inequality in the projections as well as more than half of the actual change  from 1993
to 1998.
The projections predict future inequality increases only half of the actual increase for
1993 to 1998.  This is mainly because agricultural incomes have fallen behind
nonagricultural  incomes more rapidly from 1993 to  1998 compared to the change
predicted by the cross-country evidence.  The regression estimates predict that the ratio of
agricultural GDP per worker to overall GDP per person will fall by 3.4% for the five year
periods  1998-2003  and 2003-2008.  The actual fall in expenditures per person of
predominantly agricultural  households relative to the average expenditures per person for
all households fell by 5.3% for 1993-1998.  If the 1993-1998 rate of decline in the ratio
of agricultural incomes to total incomes was extended to the future periods, projected
total income inequality would increase by 8.9% from  1998 to 2003  and 8.4% from 2003
to 2008, which is quite similar to the 9.6% rise in inequality for 1993-1998.
The projected rise in inequality is not inevitable if non-agricultural  income distribution
becomes considerably more equal in the future.  During the  1993-1998 period, however,
wage earning households and non-agricultural  enterprise household earnings both
became less equal, although predominantly "other" income household earnings became
more equal (Tables 21  and 22).  A sharp improvement in the equality of non-agricultural
earnings would be surprising.
19If the divergence of agricultural and non-agricultural  incomes is slower than predicted in
Table 24, but income distribution within the agriculture and non-agriculture remain
unchanged, then income distribution will worsen more slowly than predicted in Table 24.
The rising inequality that looks likely for Vietnam is a consequence of the declining role
agriculture as the economy develops, and the unusually equal distribution of incomes
among Vietnamese  farm households.  In low income countries with unequally distributed
agriculture,  economic development improves overall income distribution as the share of
agriculture declines.
The increase in inequality due to the decline of agriculture  can probably only be delayed
by deliberately slowing economic growth and rising incomes in Vietnam.  A way out of
rising inequality (other than a sharp improvement in the equality of non-agricultural
incomes) would be the rapid growth of incomes within agriculture while also preserving
the equality of income distribution among agricultural  households.  Sustained growth in
agricultural incomes on par with income growth in the rest of the economy is an
historical anomaly.  Vietnam escaping poverty will most likely have the unfortunate
consequence of an increase in inequality, because historically, sustained development has
almost always meant a shrinking role for agriculture.  The inequality in the non-
agricultural sector in Vietnam is not particularly high by international standards,
however,  and if unchanged,  it provides the upper limit for the effect of the declining
share of agriculture on inequality.
Conclusion
The labor market in Vietnam has seen very rapid change in the  1990s.  Average real
hourly wages grew by ten and a half percent per year between  1993 and 1998,  faster than
income per person in the economy.  At the same time there was a substantial  increase in
hours worked, especially in rural areas, and a gradual increase in the share of the labor
force in wage employment.
The rate of return to schooling is very low in Vietnam, although it increased from 2%
1993 to 4-5% in 1998.  Women face substantial wage discrimination despite their
schooling and work experience, but this also fell by half over the period.  Even
controlling for worker characteristics,  workers in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City receive a
substantial wage premium over the rest of the country, with wages over 50% higher than
any of the other regions in the country.  The primary city wage premium suggests that the
residency permit restrictions  contribute to inequality between the residents of the two
biggest cities and the rest of the country.
Despite the rapid growth of the wages in the  1990s, wage inequality fell modestly.  Wage
employment has not been the locus of growing disparity between the haves and the have-
nots in Vietnam.
20A new method for consistent decomposition of inequality by income  source shows that
contrary to the results of uncorrected  methods, wage employment contributes  a roughly
similar amount to overall income inequality as other non-agricultural employment
(household enterprise and remittances, mainly).  Agricultural income actually reduces
overall income inequality because inequality between agricultural households is much
lower than inequality between non-agricultural  households, and agricultural income has a
lower correlation with other income sources.
The much lower inequality and income level in agriculture allows us to predict future
inequality change in Vietnam, assuming that within-sector agricultural  and non-
agricultural  household income distribution do not change.  A declining share of
agriculture  as the economy grows in Vietnam means that income inequality will rise,
assuming that within-sector inequality does not change.  The rise in inequality will
probably be 5% to  10% each five years for the next decade, after increasing by 9.4%
from 1993 to 1998.
This rising inequality due to the shrinking share of agriculture will be difficult to avoid
without giving up economic growth and rapid poverty reduction in Vietnam.  Keeping a
large proportion of the Vietnamese population on household farms would keep inequality
from continuing to rise over time, but it would also keep the majority of  Vietnamese  at
very low incomes because there are not good prospects  for substantial rises in farm self-
employment income without a major movement of labor out of farming.
21Appendix A: Inequality Measures
The Gini coefficient can be defined as a multiple of the covariance  of individual income
and the rank of individual income divided by average income (Pyatt, Chen, and Fei,
1980):
G  2 cov(y, r)
N y
where yi is individual income, ri is the rank of individual i when the population is ordered
by increasing income,  cov(Q)  is the sample covariance,  and  y  is average income.
The Generalized Entropy measures of inequality have the form  (Sen, 1997, p. 140)
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which is the squared coefficient of variation.
For mutually exclusive groups, the overall Generalized Entropy indices decomposes  into
a weighted sum of the inequality indices of the groups that make up the whole.  Assume
there are several groups k with population Nk, average group income  -lk' and within-
group inequality index Ia,.  Then a Generalized Entropy index I, can be written as the
sum I,  = I,w  + I.,  of the total within-group inequality Iaw and between-group  inequality
Ia (Shorrocks,  1984).
I  ENk (kJa
Nllw=  =  ak
is a weighted sum of the within-group  indices. Between-group  inequality Ia  has the form
of Ia with  Y,k  substituted fory i.
22Appendix B.  Inconsistency of Inequality Shares in the Presence of Income
Measurement Error
For simplicity, take the case where income only comes from two possible sources: wage
employment  (w) and self-employment  (s).  Self-employment  income is observed with
measurement  error, while wages are observed without error (relaxed below).  Total
income for person i is  yi = y,4 + y,;, where  y,,  is wage income, and  y,j is income from
self-employment.  Observed income for person i is y, = ywi  + y,;, where  yi is measured
income from self-employment.  ys  = yj + 0,  where  9, is the measurement error.  Actual
incomes have a constant mean and variance, and may be correlated  across source:
E(yj)  = Aw; E(y,i) = A,;
a, (YJ)  = aw; a2(y,)  = a,;
a(yW,yJ,)  = a,.
Self-employment measurement  error has a zero mean, constant variance,  and is
uncorrelated with incomes or across time:
E(0,) = 0;  a2(0.) = a2;
a(oy,i) = a(9iY1 i) = 0;
a(oioj) =  0 Vi  1  j  .
The estimated contribution of wage employment income to inequality relative to self-
employment  income from Shorrock's equation (1)  above is
. _ cov(y.,y,)  /cov(y,,y*)  = cov(yw,y,)
r  - var(y)  /  var(y')  cov(y  , y)
ry  does not provide a consistent estimate of the ratio of income source contributions to
inequality,  }y
plimr* = PI(  cov(y., Y))  aw +a.  2
cov(y  ,y)  a,2 + as  +  a-,
2 aw +a-  =  cov(yw,y)  = plimy.  (B)
a,  +a,.W  cov(y,,y)
Wage Income Also Measured with Error
In real life, of course, wage income will also be measured with some error, though
usually much less than the errors in imputed self-employment  income.  Wage income
certainly has "errors" if we are really interested in the inequality of permanent income,  so
that annual income would be viewed an estimate of permanent income containing
substantial error, even though annual income itself is measured perfectly accurately.  We
23show that as long as the variance of self-employment income is large enough relative to
wage income, then the same result as in Equation B I  still holds.
Let  y 1 = y,i + Y,, where  y'  is measured income from wages.  y", = yw  + qi where  Oi  is
the measurement  error.  All other variables are the same as above, and
E(Oj  ) = O;  a2 (0i) = a02;
C(AiY)  = C(OiYJ = 0;
a(qizj) = 0 Vi # j;
a(oioi)  =  °0-
Then the estimated contribution of wages relative to self-employment for income
inequality is biased:
plimr  = pl  (cov(y,  y*)''=  cTw +a5w +oa
COV(y5,XY)  a-2 + a,"  + ai
a2  / a  +aw  cov(yw,y)  plimy.
a,'  + aSw  COV(y 5 y)
plimy  < plimy <* a'  2  (a,2 + CxW)  > 0-',  (aW + aW),
so plimy* < plimr if o-  > a)  and a,' 2 aw . That is, wages will appear to make a greater
contribution  to income inequality than it really does when measurement error is worse for
self-employment income than wage income,  and actual self-employment  income is more
variable than wage income, both of which are likely to be true.
Consistent Estimator
If we observe a second estimate of income whose measurement  error is uncorrelated with
the measurement  error in y,  then we can estimate consistently the contribution of each
income source to total inequality.  That is, we can estimate  a  =  (YJ  Y)  consistently,
var(y)
and hence also the ratio of the contribution of two sources of income, 'Y. We use
household consumption expenditure per person, ei, as a second estimate of income.




cr(iej) = 0 Vi ￿  j;
a(oi4i)  = C(Ojej)  = ° 
24Our estimator of the contribution of  wage income to total inequality is
cov(y°,*  ,e)
cov(y*,e)
cov(y*,e) = cov(yW  +  I,y + 6)
= coV(Yw,  y) + cOV(0, y) + cov(y,  E) + cov(0, S)
cov(y  e) = cov(y + 0 + 8, y + s)
= var(y) + cov(b, y) + cov(8, y) + cov(y, e).
Since  0,  0, and s are uncorrelated with y and Yw,  and  0  and E  are uncorrelated  with each
other,
plim[cov(,  y)] = a(O, y) = 0
plim[cov(y",  S)] = 0r(Yw,  E) = 0
plim[cov(0, s)] = U(q5, s) = 0
plim[cov(O, y)] = a(9,  y) = 0
plim[cov(y, e)] = a(y,  s) = 0,
so,
plim[cov(yw,  )]  aw + a  =pm
pliin:  et  =  plim a,,
plim[var(y)]  a'  + a'  + 2c,,,
For r =  -,  it follows that
pi  A  a  +  U5W  =  lim 0*  + aO
So combining income shares from the poorly measured  income data with total household
expenditure  allows us to obtain consistent estimates of the relative contribution of
different income sources to total inequality.
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26Figurel. Economic  Growth in Vietnam
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27Figure 2. Agricultural Labor Force Declines with Income Level
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28Table  6. Wages Levels and Growth by Region
1993  1998  Annual change  % of 1998
wage  wage  1993-1998 (%)  HCMC Wage
Ho Chi Minh City  2.60  4.70  11.9  100.0
Hanoi  1.94  4.91  18.6  104.5
Medium Urban  1.64  3.10  12.8  66.0
Small Urban  1.81  2.91  9.5  61.9
Rural North  1.54  2.39  8.8  50.9
Rural Central  1.50  2.41  9.5  51.2
Rural South  1.93  2.65  6.4  56.4
Total  1.85  3.13  10.5  66.6
Wages are mean hourly compensation in thousand  1998 Dong
Table 7. Skilled Private Non-agricultural Wage by Region
1993  1998  Annual change  % of 1998
wage  wage  1993-1998 (%)  HCMC Wage
Ho Chi Minh City  2.34  5.57  17.3  100.0
Hanoi  1.50  5.75  26.8  103.1
Medium Urban  1.53  3.16  14.5  56.7
Small Urban  1.82  2.95  9.7  53.0
Rural North  1.90  2.58  6.2  46.4
Rural Central  2.57  3.02  3.2  54.2
Rural South  2.23  3.62  9.7  65.1
Total  2.01  3.78  12.6  67.9
Wages  are mean hourly compensation in thousand  1998  Dong
31Table 8: Average Annual Hours Worked in Wage-Employment
Change
1993-1998
Region  1993  1998  (%)
Ho Chi Minh City  2,176  2,365  8.7
Hanoi  2,022  2,113  4.5
Medium Urban  2,027  2,184  7.7
Small Urban  1,816  2,169  19.4
RuralNorth  1,113  1,460  31.2
Rural Central  1,321  1,576  19.3
Rural South  1,276  1,628  27.6
Total  1,572  1,862  18.4
Source:  Author's calculations  from 1993 and 1998 VLSS data.
32Table 9: Wage Regressions,  1993  and 1998
(1)  (2)  (3)
Difference
1993  1998  1998-1993
Schooling (years)  0.029  0.050  0.021
(6.29)**  (14.61)**  (3.84)**
-Experience (years)  0.033  0.025  -0.008
(5.42)**  (4.80)**  (0.93)
Experience  squared  -0.001  -0.001  0.000
(5.37)**  (4.52)**  (0.66)
Constant  7.269  7.757  0.488
(91.40)**  (128.23)**  (4.76)**
Observations  2,007  .3,033
p2 0.04  0.08
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
33Table  10: Wage Regressions,  1993 and  1998
(1)  (2)  (3)
Difference
1993  1998  1998-1993
Schooling (years)  0.019  0.035  0.016
(3.27)**  (8.01)**  (2.19)*
Experience (years)  0.027  0.028  0.001
(4.72)**  (6.04)**  (0.15)
Experience squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000
(4.71)**  (5.55)**  (0.29)
Female  -0.370  -0.182  0.188
(10.69)**  (6.83)**  (4.27)**
Minority  0.030  -0.107  -0.137
(0.39)  (2.05)*  (1.58)
Chinese  0.224  0.005  -0.220
(2.66)**  (0.07)  (2.17)*
Non-agricultural  employment  0.126  0.289  0.163
(2.79)**  (6.42)**  (2.45)*
Private employer  0.001  0.082  0.081
(0.01)  (2.38)*  (1.37)
Ho Chi Minh City  0.609  0.589  -0.020
(11.19)**  (16.24)**  (0.32)
Hanoi  0.296  0.384  0.088
(4.15)**  (6.58)**  (1.06)
Constant  7.353  7.530  0.177
(71.91)**  (91.24)**  (1.24)
Observations  2,007  3,033
R2 0.18  0.22
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
34Table 1  1: Wage Regressions by Region,  1998
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Ho Chi  Hanoi  Medium  Small  Rural  Rural  Rural
Minh City  Urban  Urban  North  Central  South
Schooling (years)  0.054  0.085  0.045  0.032  0.069  0.027  0.015
(6.11)**  (4.20)**  (3.86)**  (2.44)*  (4.63)**  (2.54)*  (1.59)
Experience  (years)  0.019  0.029  0.022  0.047  0.026  0.020  0.035
(1.76)  (1.58)  (1.79)  (3.15)**  (2.28)*  (1.63)  (3.54)**
Experience squared  -0.000  -0.001  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000  -0.001
(1.25)  (1.43)  (1.06)  (2.72)**  (2.44)*  (1.43)  (3.90)**
Female  -0.241  -0.284  -0.204  -0.196  -0.134  -0.066  -0.249
(3.99)**  (2.40)*  (3.19)**  (2.84)**  (1.54)  (1.02)  (4.47)**
Minority  -0.345  1.561  0.116  -0.301  0.138  -0.067  -0.202
(3.36)**  (15.18)**  (0.51)  (1.16)  (1.17)  (0.71)  (2.25)*
Non-agricultural employment  0.245  1.218  0.235  0.502  0.896  0.300  0.352
(0.87)  (5.50)**  (1.74)  (3.02)**  (4.70)**  (3.48)**  (5.12)**
Private employer  0.012  0.014  -0.154  -0.052  0.260  0.406  0.057
(0.15)  (0.11)  (1.98)*  (0.46)  (2.65)**  (5.07)**  (0.78)
Constant  8.093  6.480  7.774  7.205  6.312  7.384  7.727
(24.73)**  (12.30)**  (32.66)**  (25.19)**  (22.52)**  (36.55)**  (51.21)**
Observations  556  215  499  402  270  433  658
R 2  0.13  0.19  0.13  0.12  0.23  0.15  0.16
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at  1%
35Table  12. Wages of  poorest 20% grew fastest
1993 wage  1998 wage  Annual percent change
Poorest 20%  0.59  1.18  13.8
Middle 60%  1.60  2.58  9.6
Richest 20%  3.94  7.01  11.5
Total  1.87  3.13  10.3
Wages are mean hourly wages in thousand 1998 Dong
Source: Author's calculations  from 1993  and  1998 VLSS data.
Table  13.  Wages of poor in 1993 grew faster 1993-1998, rich grew slowei
1993 wage  1998 wage  Annual percent change
Poorest 20% in 1993  0.61  2.07  24.4
Middle 60% in 1993  1.60  3.03  12.8
Richest 20% in  1993  3.82  4.80  4.6
Wages are mean hourly wages in thousand  1998 Dong
Source: Author's calculations from 1993 and 1998 VLSS data.
Table  14. Wages of poor in 1998 fell 1993-1998, rich grew fastest
1993 wage  1998 wage  Annual percent change
Poorest 20% in 1998  1.25  1.20  -0.7
Middle  60% in 1998  1.78  2.66  8.1
Richest 20% in 1998  2.81  6.40  16.4
Wages are mean hourly wages in thousand  1998 Dong
Source: Author's calculations from  1993  and 1998 VLSS data.
36Table  15. Inequality Measures of 1993 Annual Wages by Region
!  J  Io  i  h  ,12'  Gini
Ho Chi Minh City  0.204  0.178  0.221  0.312
Hanoi  0.188  0.182  0.210  0.332
Medium Urban  0.239  0.236  0.318  0.365
Small Urban  0.351  0.306  0.388  0.420
Rural North  0.310  0.261  0.301  0.393
Rural Central  0.242  0.231  0.276  0.372
Rural South  0.322  0.263  0.303  0.394
Total Within Group  0.280  0.238  0.304
Between Group  0.036  0.039  0.044
Overall  0.316  0.277  0.348  0.403
Source:  Author's calculations from  1993  VLSS data.
Table  16. Inequality Measures of 1998 Annual Wages by Region
Jo  II  I2  Gini
Ho Chi Minh City  0.264  0.259  0.359  0.378
Hanoi  0.243  0.232  0.311  0.355
Medium Urban  0.223  0.216  0.281  0.351
Small Urban  0.241  0.243  0.356  0.362
Rural North  0.190  0.163  0.170  0.314
Rural  Central  0.158  0.144  0.162  0.290
Rural South  0.235  0.211  0.250  0.351
Total Within Group  0.222  0.218  0.329
Between  Group  0.039  0.042  0.046
Overall  0.261  0.260  0.375  0.377
Source:  Author's calculations from  1998 VLSS data.
37Table  17: Inequality of household expenditure per person
Io  II  '2  Gini
1993  0.188  0.211  0.308  0.339
1998  0.207  0.235  .0.347  0.357
Source: Author's  calculations from  1998 VLSS data.
Table  18.  Household Expenditure per Capita Broken Down by Main
Income Source,  1998
Population  Fraction of  Income
share  Mean  Household  share
Expenditure p.c.
Farming  0.541  2,157  0.722  0.391
Household Enterprise  0.176  4,019  1.345  0.237
Wage Employment  0.179  3,570  1.195  0.214
Other Income Sources  0.103  4,574  1.531  0.158
Source: Author's calculations from  1998 VLSS data.
38Table  19. Decomposition of Household Income and Household
Expenditure Inequality by Source, 1993
No Correction  Consistent Estimates
Share of  Share of Inequality  Share of
Inequality (%)  (%)  Income (%)
Farming  4.0  -5.2  36.3
Household Enterprise  40.2  40.4  25.0
Wage Employment  15.1  17.0  22.9
Other Income  40.6  47.9  15.8
Source:  Author's calculations  from  1993 VLSS data.
Table 20. Decomposition of Household Income and Household
Expenditure Inequality by Source,  1998
No Correction  Consistent Estimates
Share of  Share of Inequality  Share of
Inequality(%)  (%)  Income (%)
Farming  15.6  -3.4  39.0
Household Enterprise  39.3  38.9  24.1
Wage Employment  17  29.3  19.3
Other Income  28.1  35.2  17.6
Source: Author's  calculations from  1998 VLSS data.
39Table 21. Inequality Measures of Household Expenditure per Capita
Broken Down by Main Income Source,  1993
Io  II  I2  Gini
Farming  0.115  0.124  0.161  0.263
Household Enterprise  0.186  0.199  0.267  0.336
Wage Employment  0.185  0.192  0.236  0.337
Other Income Sources  0.269  0.284  0.401  0.401
Within Group  0.154  0.176  0.271
Between Group  0.033  0.035  0.037
Total  0.188  0.211  0.308  0.339
Source:  Author's calculations from 1998  VLSS data.
Table 22. Inequality Measures of Household Expenditure per Capita
Broken Down by Main Income Source,  1998
I0  II  12  Gini
Farming  0.103  0.106  0.125  0.251
Household Enterprise  0.198  0.213  0.286  0.349
Wage Employment  0.250  0.267  0.375  0.390
Other Income Sources  0.220  0.234  0.308  0.367
Within Group  0.158  0.186  0.297
Between Group  0.048  0.048  0.049
Total  0.207  0.235  0.347  0.357
Source: Author's calculations from 1998 VLSS data.
40Table 23: Agriculture in relation to income across countries
(1)  (2)
Ag. labor share 1 Ag. output p.c. ratio2
GDP per person (log of 1996 PPP USD)  -0.056  -0.200
(20.65)**  (26.33)**
Time (year  1960 = 1)  -0.0045  0.0042
(57.59)**  (20.48)**
Constant  9.87  -6.18
(69.67)**  (16.41)**
Observations  3,399  2,926
Number of Countries  114  106
R2  0.73  0.21
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
significant at 5%;  ** significant at 1%
Both regressions includes  country-specific  constants.
1)  Ag. labor share is the fraction of agricultural workers in the total labor force.
2) Ag. output p.c. ratio is the ratio of agricultural value added per worker to GDP per capita.
41Table 24: Inequality Projections 2003 and 2008.
1998  2003  2008
(Actual)  (Projected)  (Projected)
GDP per person a  325  428  563
GDP p.c.  growt5P  5.5%  5.5%  5.5%
Proportion of labor in agriculturec  54.1%  50.3%  46.5%
Agricultural  GDP per workerd  235  224  214
Non-agricultural  GDP per workerd  431  429  425
Inequality of agricultural income (Io)e  0.103  0.103  0.103
Inequality of non-agricultural  income (Io)e  0.223  0.223  0.223
Total within inequality (Io)  0.158  0.163  0.167
Inequality between ag/non-ag (Io)  0.046  0.052  0.057
Total income inequality (Io)  0.204  0.215  0.224
Change in inequality (since 5 years before)  9.6%  4.9%  4.4%
a For 1998, this is the purchasing power parity GNP per capita estimate for Vietnam (World Bank, 2000b).
The  1998 level of GNP per capita is not used in the projections.
b  5.5%  real growth of GDP per capita is the rate for Vietnam for 1988-1998  (World Bank, 2000b).
c 1998 value estimated by proportion of working age individuals in predominantly  agricultural households
in the 1998 VLSS (Table  18).
d  1998 value estimated from the ratio of average expenditures per person of  predominantly agricultural  and
non-agricultural  households (Table  18).
' All values  set to the 1998 value estimated from the VLSS (Table 22).
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